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ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
the suit of the purchaser, and, apparently, no authority to the contrary has been found by the learned author.
Once the fact of knowledge is established, it would seem unfair
upon principle to deprive the original purchaser of his specific remedy
merely because the title has passed from the party with whom he contracted; nor should a subsequent vendee be heard to disclaim knowledge gained by an attorney within the apparent scope of his authority
while handling a matter entrusted to him.
2
82E As AFFECTING COMMON LAW
HIGHWAY LAW; SECTION
LIABILITY OF OWNER OF MOTOR VEHICLE-The action is to recover for

death alleged to have been occasioned through the negligent operation
of an automobile. The uncontradicted evidence necessitates the conclusion that the driver of the car was using it at the time of the accident
for his own purposes exclusively, without the permission and against
the commands of the defendant his employer. Held, The action would
not lie inasmuch as the plaintiff gained nothing by Sec. 282e of the
Highway Law (Cons. Law Chap. 25) providing that the owners of
motor vehicles, operated upon public highways, shall be liable for death
or injuries to person or property resulting from negligent operation
by any person legally using same with the permission, express or implied. of the owner. Judgment affirmed. Fluegel v. Coudert, 244 N.
Y. 392 (1927).
The Court held that the effect of the statute was to render obsolete the doctrine of such cases as Van Blaricom v. Dodgson, 220 N.
Y., 111, 115 N. E. 443 (1917); Potts v. Pardee, 220 N. Y., 431, 436,
116 N. E. 78 (1917), and that liability no longer depended on use or
operation by a servant in the "business" of a master, but upon its
legal use or operation in the business "or otherwise" of the master
with permission or consent. Thus the owner who loaned the car tb a
friend or an employee would be liable for the negligence of the operator though the loan was unrelated to employment and a mere friendly
accommodation. The father would be liable for the negligence of the
son to whom he had entrusted the use of the family automobile (Van
Blaricom v. Dodgson, supra). The Court significantly stated, "We
make no attempt at exhaustive enumeration. What has been said will
suffice for illustration or example." It would thus appear that the
Highway Law does not recognize such independent operation by a
gratuitous bailee as will relieve the bailor from liability for the
former's negligence, and the Court's opinion would seem to indicate
that the section is still charged with such pregnant possibilities as will
materially change the law of automobiles. 1 St. John's L. Rev., 53, 54
(1926).
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PARTIES-Defendant

sold to one Edgar an automobile under a conditional bill of sale contract. Edgar paid $50 in cash and gave a promissory note for the
balance of purchase price. The conditional sale contract provides
inter alia, that title should not pass until full price was paid, an
acceleration clause for balance in case of default. In event of such
default vendor may- take immediate possession of property with
privilege of resale, seller to have right to enforce any one or more

RECENT DECISIONS
remedies hereunder mentioned either successively or concurrently.
Some while later, Edgar turned over car to Defendant to store in
Defendant's garage. Several payments were not paid and Defendant
commenced an action against Edgar to recover j'udgment on the note
and did recover judgment on some, which was duly recorded. On
same day but after judgment had been entered, Edgar sold car to
Plaintiff. Defendant refuses to give up car and is sued by Plaintiff
for replevin, claiming when Defendant sued for judgment, his action
showed intention to repudiate conditional sale contract and to treat
property as if it has passed to purchaser (Edgar) absolutely and
thereby terminated right to rely on security. Held, remedies of sellct
are not inconsistent and seller never recognized ownership in buyei
where two or more concurrent remedies exist between which party
may elect, and remedies are inconsistent, party, by indicating choice
of some decisive act, with knowledge of facts is bound by election.
When a conditional vendor sues for price and recovers a judgment,
his right to security is not terminated unless same are inconsistent,
and he is not deemed to have made an election. The remedies here
are not inconsistent as by the contract the right and obligations of
Defendant are concurrent and consistent. Judgment for Defendant
affirmed. Murry ,. McDonald, 212 N. W. 711 (Sup. Ct. Iowa 1927).
Doctrine of election of remedies applies only where inconsistent
rights and remedies are involved. Rotchford v. Cayuga County Cold
Storage and Warehouse Co., 217 N. Y. 565, 112 N. W. 447, (1916),
L. R. A. 1916E 615; Reynolds v. Union Station Bk., 198 Mo. App.
323, 200 S. W. 711, (1918); Pritchard v. Williams, 175 N. C. 319,
95 S. E. 570, (1918); Warriner v. Font, 114 Miss. 174, 74 S. W. 822,
(1917); Wiedenbeck v. Anderson, 168 Wis. 212, 169 N. W. 615,
(1918); Kilgore *Lumber Co. v. Thomas, 98 Ark. 219, 135 S. W.
859, (1911); Williams v. Board of Comm. of Routt County, 48
Colo. 541, 111 Pac. 71, (1910); McKinnon v. Johnson, 59 Fla. 332,
52 So. 288, (1910); Surreny v. Glenville Supply Co., 13 Ga. App.
180, 78 S. E. 1013, (1913); Merle & Henry Mfg. Co. v. Hick, 178
Ill. App. 406; Mayberry v. Sprague, 207 Mass., 508, 93 N. E. 925,
(1911). In conditional sales contracts the obligations of the parties
are determined by language used and intention deduced from terms in
contract. Continental Guaranty Corp v. Peoples Bus Line, 117 Atl.
275, Del. (1922); Brewer v. Ford, 54 Hun (N. Y.) 116, 7 N. Y. S.
244, (5th Dept. 1889). Every decision handed down must be carefully studied in light of facts and provisions of contract involved.
Green's Uni. Laws ann. Vol. 2, pp. 36, 37. Whenever the contract by
its stipulations makes remedies inconsistent or intention of the parties
can be clearly seen, it will govern. Avery v. Chapman, 127 N. Y. S.
721, (1911); Crompton v. Beach, 62 Conn.. 25, 25 A. 466, (1892), 18
L. R. A. 187; C.f. In Frisch v. Wells, 200 Mass. 429, 86 N. E. 755,
(1909), 23 L. R. A. (N. S.) 144, there was not stipulations for
retaking but simply that title not to pass until all payments were
made. In the principal case, the contract gave to Defendant the
right of remedies which were to sue for a judgment and retain property as security, which rights are not inconsistent with each other,
as parties by their contract or agreement recognized such rights not
to be inconsistent.

